Building upon previous work on the relation between secrecy and channel resolvability, we revisit a secrecy proof for the multiple-access channel (MAC) from the perspective of resolvability. We then refine the approach in order to obtain some novel results on the second-order achievable rates. Establishing a conceptually simple converse proof for resolvability over the memoryless MAC, which relies on uniform continuity of Shannon's entropy with respect to the variational distance, we characterize the resolvability region. In a discussion of the operational meaning of the information theoretic concept of semantic security from the point of view of Ahlswede's General Theory of Information Transfer, we show some interesting implications on the resilience against a wide-ranging class of attacks even if no assumption can be made about the distributions of the transmitted messages. We then give details on how the resolvability results can be used to construct a wiretap code that achieves semantic security.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
With an increasing number of users and things being connected to each other, not only the overall amount of communication increases, but also the amount of private and personal information being transferred. This information needs to be protected from various attacks. For some potential applications, like e.g. emerging e-health technologies where sensitive medical data is transmitted using a Body Area Network, the problem of providing secrecy guarantees is a key issue. As discovered by Csiszár [12] and later more explicitly by Bloch and Laneman [10] and investigated by Yassaee and Aref [41] for the multiple-access case, the concept of channel resolvability can be applied to provide such guarantees; essentially, a channel is simulated for the wiretapper of which the observed output is almost independent of the transmitted message and thereby useless. It can further be of use as a means of exploiting channel noise in order to convey randomness to a receiver, where the observed distribution can be accurately controlled at the transmitter. In this paper, we explore channel resolvability in a multiple-access setting in which there is no communication between the transmitters, yet they can control the distribution observed at the receiver in a non-cooperative manner, and we detail how this can be used to achieve strong operational secrecy guarantees over a wiretap MAC. 
B. Literature
To the best of our knowledge, the concept of approximating a desired output distribution over a communication channel using as little randomness as possible at the transmitter was first introduced by Wyner [39] , who used normalized Kullback-Leibler divergence to measure how close the actual and the desired output distribution are. The term channel resolvability for a similar concept was introduced by Han and Verdú [23] , who however used variational distance as a metric. In particular, they showed the existence of a codebook that achieves an arbitrarily small variational distance by studying the expected variational distance of a random codebook.
Resolvability for MACs has been explored by Steinberg [34] and later by Oohama [32] . Explicit low-complexity codebooks for the special case of symmetric MACs have been proposed by Chou, Bloch and Kliewer [11] .
A stronger result stating that the probability of drawing an unsuitable random codebook is doubly exponentially small is due to Cuff [14] . Related results were proposed before by Csiszár [12] and by Devetak [16] for the quantum setting, who based his work on the non-commutative Chernoff bound [3] . Further secrecy results based on or related to the concept of channel resolvability are due to Hayashi [25] , Bloch and Laneman [10] , Hou and Kramer [27] , and Wiese and Boche [38] , who applied Devetak's approach to a multiple-access setting.
Cuff [14] also gave a result on the second-order rate; a related result was proposed by Watanabe and Hayashi [37] .
Converse results for channel resolvability have been proposed by Han and Verdú [23] and for the multiple-access channel by Steinberg [34] . However, since these papers consider channels with memory and allow for arbitrary input and output distributions (in particular, they need not be identical or independent across channel uses), these results are not directly transferrable to our memoryless case. Converse proofs for the memoryless single-user case were given by Wyner [39] and later by Hou [28] , however, they use Kullback-Leibler divergence as a distance measure instead of variational distance as in our case and so their results cannot be applied directly either.
Security concepts from cryptography have been redefined as secrecy concepts for the information theoretic setting by Bellare, Tessano and Vardy [7] [6] and their interrelations discussed, however their results beyond the interrelations of various secrecy concepts involve some cryptographic elements, such as shared secrets between transmitter and legitimate receiver or shared (public) randomness. To the best of our knowledge, there is no extensive discussion linking the concept of semantic security with operational meanings in communication theory yet.
Wiretap codes that achieve semantic security over the Gaussian channel have been proposed by Ling, Luzzi, Belfiore and Stehlé [30] . Thangaraj [35] showed how to construct semantically secure wiretap codes for the single-user channel and already noted the link to channel resolvability. Goldfeld, Cuff and Permuter [21] [20] showed how channel resolvability techniques can be used to obtain wiretap codebooks that achieve semantic security over the single-user channel; the technique had been previously sketched by Cuff [15] .
C. Overview and Outline
In this work, we revisit the proof in [38] , while focusing on channel resolvability. We use a slightly different technique as in [14] , which we extend to the multiple-access case to provide an explicit statement and a more intuitive proof for a result only implicitly contained in [38] , and extend it by providing a second-order result. We also prove a converse result to characterize the resolvability region, detail how resolvability can be used as a tool to achieve strong secrecy and semantic security and discuss operational implications of semantic security from the point of view of Ahlswede's General Theory of Information Transfer [1] .
In the following section, we state definitions and prior results that we will be using in our proofs in Section III. We then move on to proving a converse resolvability theorem and characterize the resolvability region in Section IV. Finally, in Section V we discuss some secrecy notions and their interconnections as well as some interesting operational implications of semantic security and make explicit how our results can be applied to achieve semantic security over the multiple-access wiretap channel.
II. NOTATION, DEFINITIONS AND PREREQUISITES
The operations log and exp use Euler's number as a basis, and all information quantities are given in nats.
[·] + denotes the maximum of its argument and 0.
A channel W = (X , Y, Z, q Z|X,Y ) is given by finite input alphabets X and Y, a finite output alphabet Z and a collection of probability mass functions q Z|X,Y on Z for each pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y. The random variables X, Y and Z represent the two channel inputs and the channel output, respectively. Input distributions for the channel are probability mass functions on X and Y denoted by q X and q Y , respectively. We
By a pair of codebooks of block length n and rates R 1 and R 2 , we mean finite sequences C 1 = (C 1 (m)) exp(nR1) m=1 and
, where the codewords C 1 (m) ∈ X n and C 2 (m) ∈ Y n are finite sequences of elements of the input alphabets. We define a probability distribution P C1,C2 on these codebooks as i.i.d. drawings in each component of each codeword according to q X and q Y , respectively. Accordingly, we define the output distribution induced by C 1 and C 2 on Z n by
Given probability distributions P and Q on a finite set A with mass functions p and q, respectively, and positive α = 1, the Rényi divergence of order α of P from Q is defined as
Furthermore, we define the variational distance between P and Q (or between their mass functions) as
Given random variables A, B and C distributed according to r A,B,C , we define the (conditional) information density as
The (conditional) mutual information is the expected value of the (conditional) information density. We use H(A) and H(A|B) to denote Shannon's (conditional) entropy.
The following inequality was introduced in [8] and [19] ; we use a refinement here which follows e.g. from [5] .
Theorem 1 (Berry-Esseen Inequality). Given a sequence (A k ) n k=1 of i.i.d. copies of a random variable A on the reals with EA = 0 and finite EA 2 = σ 2 and E |A| 3 = ρ, definē A := (A 1 + · · · + A n )/n. Then the cumulative distribution functions F (a) := P(Ā √ n/σ ≤ a) ofĀ √ n/σ and Φ(a) := a −∞ 1/(2π) exp(−x 2 /2)dx of the standard normal distribution satisfy for all real numbers a
We further use variations of the concentration bounds introduced in [26] .
A k , where the random variables in the sequence (A k ) n k=1 are independently distributed with values in [0, 1] and EA ≤ µ. Then for 0 < δ < 1,
This version can e.g. be found in [17, Ex. 1.1]. We will also be using an extension of the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound for dependent variables due to Janson [29, Theorem 2.1], of which we state only a specialized instance that is used in this paper.
Theorem 3 (Janson [29] ). Suppose A = n k=1 A k , where the random variables in the sequence (A k ) n k=1 take values in [0, 1] and can be partitioned into χ ≥ 1 sets such that the random variables in each set are independently distributed. Then, for δ > 0,
We will also be using [13, Lemma 2.7] which provides bounds for the entropy difference of random variables that are close to each other in terms of variational distance. Note that the definition of variational distance in [13] differs from ours by a factor of 1/2 and we state the lemma conforming with our definitions. Lemma 1. Let A and B be random variables on alphabets A and B, respectively, distributed according to probability mass functions r A and r B , respectively. If
.
Furthermore, for the proof of the converse theorem, we need a lemma that is based on the Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory theorem and appeared first in [4] and of which we state the version from [18, Appendix C].
Lemma 2. Let A be a finite and B an arbitrary set. Suppose that P is a connected compact subset of probability mass functions on A and consider a family (r b ) b∈B of elements of P. Suppose further that (f k ) n k=1 are continuous functions mapping from P to the reals and B is a random variable on B distributed according to some probability measure P . Then there exist a random variable B ′ on some alphabet B ′ of cardinality at most n with probability mass function r and a family (
III. DIRECT THEOREMS
Then there exist γ 1 , γ 2 > 0 such that for large enough block length n, the codebook distributions of block length n and rates R 1 and R 2 satisfy
This theorem can also be applied with the roles of X and Y reversed. Making use of this and generalizing a bit further, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Theorem 4 also holds for any pair of rates that satisfies
Proof. We define functions mapping from [0, 1] to the reals
Note that R 1 (λ) and R 2 (λ) are continuous in λ, R 1 (0) = I(X; Z|Y ), R 1 (1) = I(X; Z), R 2 (0) = I(Y ; Z) and R 2 (1) = I(Y ; Z|X). If R 1 > I(X; Z|Y ) or R 2 > I(Y ; Z|X), there is nothing to prove since Theorem 4 can be applied directly. So we assume R 1 ≤ I(X; Z|Y ) and R 2 ≤ I(Y ; Z|X), which means that R 1 (λ) is strictly decreasing and R 2 (λ) is strictly increasing in λ and we can find
contradicting our assumption. So we can find λ with λ 1 < λ < λ 2 . We then have R 1 > R 1 (λ) and R 2 > R 2 (λ), so the corollary follows by applying Theorem 4 to block lengths of λn and (1 − λ)n, i.e. by time sharing.
Theorem 5. Given a channel W = (X , Y, Z, q Z|X,Y ), input distributions q X and q Y , ε ∈ (0, 1), let the central second and absolute third moment of i(X; Z|Y ) be V 1 and ρ 1 , respectively; analogously, we use V 2 and ρ 2 to denote the central second and absolute third moment of i(Y ; Z). Suppose the rates R 1 , R 2 depend on n in the following way:
where Q := 1 − Φ with Φ as defined in the statement of Theorem 1, and c > 1. Then, for any d ∈ (0, c − 1), we have
where for both k = 1 and k = 2,
Again, observing that this theorem can be applied with the roles of X and Y reversed, we have Corollary 2. Theorem 5 holds with (3) and (4) replaced by
and V 1 , ρ 1 , V 2 and ρ 2 redefined to be the second and third moments of i(X; Z) and i(Y ; Z|X), respectively.
Remark 2. The question of how the achievable second-order rates behave near the line connecting the two corner points should be a subject of further research.
In the proofs of these theorems, we consider two types of typical sets:
We split the variational distance in atypical and typical parts as follows, where P atyp,1 , P atyp,2 and P typ (z n ) are defined by (5), (6) and (7) shown on the next page.
Remark 3. The denominator of the fraction is almost surely not equal to 0 as long as the numerator is not equal to 0. We implicitly let the summation range only over the support of the denominator, as we do in all further summations.
So the theorems can be proven by considering typical and atypical terms separately. But first, we prove two lemmas to help us to bound the typical and the atypical terms.
Lemma 3 (Bound for typical terms). Given a block length n, ε > 0, 0 < δ < 1, random variables A, B and C on finite alphabets A, B and C respectively with joint probability mass function r A,B,C , a rate R and a codebook C = (C(m))
with each component of each codeword drawn i.i.d. according to r A , for any b n ∈ B n and c n ∈ C n , we havě
where the typical set is defined as T n ε := {(a n , b n , c n ) : i(a n ; c n |b n ) ≤ n(I(A; C|B) + ε)}.
Proof. We havě
By the definition of T n ε in (9), the summands are at most 1, and furthermore, the expectation of the sum can be bounded as
Now applying Theorem 2 to the above shows the desired probability statement and completes the proof.
Lemma 4 (Bound for atypical terms). Given a channel
as well as rates R 1 and R 2 and codebooks distributed according to P C1,C2 defined in Section II, we havê
Proof. We havê
where the inequality follows from Theorem 3 by observing that the innermost sum is confined to [0, 1], the two outer summations together have exp(n(R 1 + R 2 ) summands which can be partitioned into exp(n(max(R 1 , R 2 )) sets with exp(n min(R 1 , R 2 )) independently distributed elements each, and the overall expectation of the term is exp(n(
Proof of Theorem 4. In order to bound P atyp,1 , we observe that for any α > 1, we can bound P X n ,Y n ,Z n ((X n , Y n , Z n ) / ∈ T n 1,ε ) as shown in (64) to (67) in the appendix, where the inequality in (67) holds as long as β < (α − 1)(I(X; Z|Y ) + ε − D α P X,Y,Z ||P X|Y P Z|Y P Y ). We can achieve this for sufficiently small β > 0 as long as α > 1 and I(X; Z|Y ) + ε − D α P X,Y,Z ||P X|Y P Z|Y P Y > 0. In order to choose an α > 1 such that the latter requirement holds, note that since our alphabets are finite, the Rényi divergence is also finite and thus it is continuous and approaches the Kullback-Leibler divergence for α tending to 1 [36] , which is in this case equal to the mutual information term.
We apply Lemma 4 with A = (X n × Y n × Z n ) \ T n 1,ε and δ = 1 to obtain
Proceeding along similar lines of reasoning including another application of
As for the typical term, we first observe that for any fixed y n and z n , we can apply Lemma 3 with A = X, B = Y , C = Z and δ = exp(−nβ) to obtain
where we used
We define a set of codebooks
and bound for arbitrary but fixed z ñ
in (68) to (71) in the appendix, where (68) follows from the law of total probability, (69) is a consequence of the condition C 1 ∈ C z n , (70) results from an application of the law of total probability and the assumption that n is sufficiently large such that exp(−nβ) ≤ 1. Finally, (71) follows from Lemma 3 with A = Y , C = Z, B a deterministic random variable with only one possible realization and δ = exp(−nβ).
We can now put everything together as shown in (72) to (74) in the appendix, where (73) follows from (8) and the union bound and (74) is a substitution of (10), (11) , (12) and (71).
What remains is to choose γ 1 and γ 2 such that (2) holds. First, we have to choose ε and β small enough such that the terms min(
are all positive. Since there have so far been no constraints on β and ε except that they are positive and sufficiently small, such a choice is possible provided R 1 > I(X; Z|Y ) and R 2 > I(Y ; Z). The theorem then follows for large enough n by choosing γ 2 positive, but smaller than the minimum of these three positive terms, and γ 2 < β.
Proof of Theorem 5. We consider the typical sets T n 1,ε1 and T n 2,ε2 , where for k = 1, 2, we choose ε k > 0 to be
The definitions (5), (6) and (7) change accordingly.
In order to bound P atyp,1 , we use Theorem 1 to obtain
An application of Lemma 4 with δ = 1/ √ n yields
Reasoning along similar lines shows
For the typical term, we use the definitions (13) and (14) with the typical set T n 1,ε1 , and observe that for any fixed y n and z n , we can apply Lemma 3 with A = X, B = Y , C = Z and δ = 1/ √ n to obtain
Now proceeding in a similar manner as in (68) to (71) shows
where there is no assumption on n because 1/ √ n ≤ 1 for all n ≥ 1.
The theorem then follows from (75) to (78) in the appendix, where (76) results from (8) and the union bound, (77) follows by substituting (16), (17) and (18) , and (78) follows by substituting (3), (4) and (15), as well as elementary operations.
IV. CONVERSE THEOREM AND THE RESOLVABILITY REGION
Given a channel W = (X , Y, Z, q Z|X,Y ) and an output distribution q Z , we call a rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) achievable if there are sequences of codebooks (C 1,n ) n≥1 , (C 2,n ) n≥1 of rates R 1 and R 2 and block lengths n such that lim n→∞ p Z n |C1,n,C2,n − q Z n TV = 0.
The resolvability region S W,qZ is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs. A standard time sharing argument yields Lemma 5. For any W and q Z , the region S W,qZ is convex.
The main result of this section is
where p V ranges over all probability mass functions on the alphabet V := {1, . . . , |Z| + 3} and q X|V , q Y |V range over all conditional probability distributions such that, for every v ∈ V and z ∈ Z,
and the mutual information is computed with respect to the induced joint probability mass function. Then S ′ W,qZ = S W,qZ . The part S ′ W,qZ ⊆ S W,qZ is a consequence of the results in the previous section. As a direct consequence of Corollary 1, all points in S ′ W,qZ that correspond to constant V are in S W,qZ . The full inclusion then follows by Lemma 5.
For S ′ W,qZ ⊇ S W,qZ , on the other hand, we need a suitable converse result. The goal of the reminder of this section is thus to establish the following converse theorem which directly implies this second inclusion.
Theorem 7. Let W = (X , Y, Z, q Z|X,Y ) be a channel, q X , q Y input distributions (with induced output distribution q Z ) and (C 1,n ) n≥1 , (C 2,n ) n≥1 sequences of codebooks of block lengths n and rates R 1 and R 2 , respectively, such that lim n→∞ p Z n |C1,n,C2,n − q Z n TV = 0.
Then there are random variables X on X , Y on Y, Z on Z and V on alphabet V = {1, . . . , |Z| + 3} with a joint probability mass function p V p X|V p Y |V q Z|X,Y such that the marginal distribution of Z is q Z and
Lemma 6. Let W = (X , Y, Z, q Z|X,Y ) be a channel, q X , q Y input distributions (with induced output distribution q Z ) and C 1 , C 2 a pair of codebooks of rates R 1 , R 2 and block length n such that
Then there are random variablesX on X ,Ŷ on Y,Ẑ on Z andV on V := {1, . . . , n} with a joint probability mass function pV pX |V pŶ |V qẐ |X,Ŷ such that
Proof. The codebooks induce random variablesX n ,Ỹ n and Z n with joint probability mass function pX n ,Ỹ n ,Z n (x n , y n , z n ) = p X n ,Y n ,Z n |C1,C2 (x n , y n , z n )
Note that for notational convenience, we will throughout this proof use the definition of pX n ,Ỹ n ,Z n and the definitions implied through the marginals of this probability mass function even if the same probability mass functions have already been introduced using a different notation before; e.g. we will write pZ n instead of p Z n |C1,C2 .
Additionally, we define a random variableV that is uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , n} and independent of the other random variables. We furthermore defineX :=X V ,Ŷ :=Ỹ V andẐ :=Z V , noting that the conditional distribution ofẐ givenX andŶ is q Z|X,Y .
We observe that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, an application of the triangle inequality yields
Now, we can bound
where (28) is by definition ofV andẐ, (29) follows by the triangle inequality and (30) by applying (27) . Next, we bound nI(X,Ŷ ;Ẑ|V ) − I(X n ,Ỹ n ;Z n )
as shown in (79) through (82) in the appendix, where the inequality step in (82) follows by (22) , (27) and Lemma 1.
Taking into consideration that n(R 1 + R 2 ) ≥ H(X n ,Ỹ n ) ≥ I(X n ,Ỹ n ;Z n ) and that (n + 1)/n ≤ 2, this proves (24) . Furthermore, we note that nI(X;Ẑ|V ) − I(X n ;Z n ) = nI(X,Ŷ ;Ẑ|V ) − I(X n ,Ỹ n ;Z n ) − nI(Ŷ ;Ẑ|X,V ) − I(Ỹ n ;Z n |X n )
where the inequality step follows by (31) and the observation that
= nI(Ŷ ;Ẑ|X,V ), where (33) follows by the entropy chain rule, (34) follows from the fact thatZ k is conditionally independent of the other random variables givenX k andỸ k and (35) follows because conditioning does not increase entropy. By the same line of reasoning, but exchanging the roles of X and Y , we can bound
In a similar way as we obtained (24) from (31), we can derive the bounds (25) and (26) from (32) and (36), respectively. where f 4,z defines a set of |Z| functions. Note that the mutual information terms depend only on r v and are continuous. The lemma now gives us a random variable V ′ distributed according to r on some alphabet of cardinality at most |Z| + 3 and probability mass functions (r ′ v ′ ) v ′ ∈V ′ corresponding to random variables independently distributed on X and Y. These probability mass functions induce random variables X ′ and Y ′ that depend on V ′ , but are conditionally independent given V ′ . We further define a random variable Z ′ on Z depending on X ′ and Y ′ through q Z|X,Y . We have, by (1), (24), (25) and (26) are preserved for the new random variables. Furthermore, also by (1), we have for each z ∈ Z,
implying that (23) is preserved and completing the proof of the corollary.
We are now ready to put everything together and prove our main converse result.
Proof of Theorem 7. We write δ n := p Z n |C1,n,C2,n − q Z n TV , and apply Corollary 3 with C 1 := C 1,n , C 2 := C 2,n and δ := δ n to obtain random variables X n , Y n , Z n and V n satisfying conditions (23), (24), (25) and (26) . We assume without loss of generality that V n are all on the same alphabet V with cardinality |Z| + 3 and observe that the space of probability distributions on a finite alphabet is compact. So we can pick an increasing sequence (n k ) k≥1 such that p Vn k converges to a probability mass function p V , p Xn k |Vn k =v converges for all v ∈ V to a probability mass function p X|V =v and p Yn k |Vn k =v converges for all v ∈ V to a probability mass function p Y |V =v . The random variables X, Y , Z and V are then defined by the joint probability mass function p V p X|V p Y |V q Z|X,Y . (23) implies that the marginal distribution of Z is q Z , (24) implies (19) , (25) implies (20) and (26) implies (21) .
V. CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY AND SECRECY
In this section, we summarize some existing notions of secrecy and a few facts about their relations to each other and also discuss their operational meaning. We then show explicitly how our channel resolvability results can be applied to yield a secrecy result for the multiple-access wiretap channel that not only implies strong secrecy, but has even stronger operational properties than the classical notion of strong secrecy. We start by providing some additional definitions in Subsection V-A, then we discuss some notions for secrecy and how they are connected in Subsection V-B, before we move on to show how our resolvability results can be used to achieve secrecy over the multiple-access channel. To this end, we first repeat a well-known result on achievable rates for the multiple-access channel in Subsection V-C which is the second crucial ingredient besides resolvability for the secrecy theorem we prove in Subsection V-D.
A. Additional Definitions
In contrast to the other sections, in this section we will also look at probability distributions on the alphabet of possible messages. We therefore use M 1 := {1, . . . , exp(nR 1 )} and M 2 := {1, . . . , exp(nR 2 )} to denote the message alphabets; for convenience we denote by M := M 1 × M 2 the message alphabet of both transmitters. M 1 , M 2 and M = (M 1 , M 2 ) are random variables on M 1 , M 2 and M, respectively, to denote the messages chosen by the transmitters to be sent and p M denotes a probability mass function on M describing the distribution of M .
A wiretap channel W = (W legit , W tap ) is a pair of channels, where W legit = (X , Y, Z legit , q Z legit |X,Y ), called the legitimate receiver's channel and W tap = (X , Y, Z tap , q Ztap|X,Y ), called the wiretapper's channel, share the same input alphabets.
A wiretap code of block length n for the multiple-access channel consists of two collections of probability mass functions p X n |M1 for each m 1 ∈ M 1 and p Y n |M2 for each m 2 ∈ M 2 (called the encoders), as well as a decoder d n : Z n legit → M. The encoders and the wiretap channel together induce for each m ∈ M a wiretapper's output distribution on Z n tap . In this paper, we will consider a special class of wiretap encoders: By a pair of wiretap codebooks of block length n, information rates R 1 , R 2 and randomness rates L 1 , L 2 , we mean functions C 1 : {1, . . . , exp(nR 1 )}×{1, . . . , exp(nL 1 )} → X n and C 2 : {1, . . . , exp(nR 2 )} × {1, . . . , exp(nL 2 )} → Y n . Given input distributions q X and q Y , we define a probability distribution P C1,C2 on the set of all possible codebooks such that every component of every function value is independently distributed according to q X or q Y , respectively. Such a pair of codebooks induces encoders in the sense defined above: For k ∈ {1, 2}, transmitter k picks (independently of the other transmitter and without cooperation) a message m k ∈ {1, . . . , exp(nR k )} and draws uniformly at random ℓ k ∈ {1, . . . , exp(nL k )}. The transmitted codeword is then C k (m k , ℓ k ). The wiretapper's output distribution induced by these encoders is p Z n tap |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) (z n ) := exp(−n(L 1 + L 2 )) exp(nL1) ℓ1=1 exp(nL2) ℓ2=1 q Z n tap |X n ,Y n (z n |C 1 (m 1 , ℓ 1 ), C 2 (m 2 , ℓ 2 )).
B. Secrecy Concepts and their Operational Meanings
In this subsection, we give a short overview over some notions of information-theoretic secrecy. We adapt the notation in the sources we are citing in such a way that it conforms with the notation we have been using in this paper, which is specific to the multiple-access wiretap channel, but the concepts apply also to (and have originally been introduced for) wiretap channels with only one transmitter.
Before we give formal definitions of secrecy, we first take a look at what operational implications we want a good notion of secrecy to have. In [1] , Ahlswede generalized the communication task in the following way: The transmitter picks a message M ∈ M, encodes it and transmits the codeword over a channel. The receiver then aims not necessarily at decoding the exact message M , but rather has a partition {M 1 , . . . , M ℓ } of M, i.e. disjoint subsets of M with ∪ ℓ k=1 M k = M. Its task is then to reconstruct k such that M ∈ M k . The transmitter does not know the exact partition Π that defines the receiver's task, but has only a subset {Π 1 , . . . , Π t } of the set of all possible partitions of M and has to encode the message in such a way that the receiver can decode with high probability no matter which partition in this set defines its task, or put differently, we assume there is one receiver for each partition and we want each receiver to be able to decode with high probability. Ahlswede gave a list of specializations of this very general concept that he deemed potentially useful for real-world communication systems. Two of these are: 1) t = 1 and the only partition Π 1 is the partition of singletons {{m} : m ∈ M}. Here the receiver's task amounts to Shannon's classical decoding problem. 2) t = |M| and the set of partitions is
This corresponds to the problem of identification codes introduced by Ahlswede and Dueck [2] . These decoding tasks can not only be understood as having to be performed by a legitimate receiver in cooperation with the transmitter, but can also be seen as possible attacks carried out by a wiretapper, where each possible attack is defined by a partition on M. For instance, we could deem the wiretapper's attack to have been successful only if it is able to decode the exact message which corresponds to item 1), or, by an alternative definition, we might choose a particular message m that the wiretapper has to identify corresponding to one of the partitions of item 2) and thus obtain a much weaker definition of what constitutes a successful attack.
The best thing we might wish for in this context would be that the wiretapper be unable to perform attacks corresponding to any possible partition of the message set. In fact, demanding this is equivalent to insisting that the wiretapper shall not be able to decode any function of the transmitted message (because a function induces a partition of its domain via the preimages of singletons in its range).
Shannon introduced the concept of information theoretic secrecy and required for his condition of perfect secrecy [33] that I(M ; Z n tap ) = 0. In Shannon's cipher system, both legitimate receiver and wiretapper get the same channel output, but transmitter and legitimate receiver share a key, which is unknown to the wiretapper.
Later, Wyner introduced the wiretap channel, where the wiretapper's channel output is degraded with respect to the legitimate receiver's channel output, but wiretapper and legitimate receiver do not share a key. In order to be more amenable to analysis, he weakened Shannon's perfect secrecy criterion and introduced the concept of weak secrecy [40] . A sequence of codes for increasing block length n is said to achieve weak secrecy if I(M ; Z n tap )/n approaches 0 as n tends to infinity, where M is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the message set. It can be seen from the definition that a sequence of codes can achieve weak secrecy while the total amount of information leaked still tends to infinity with the block length approaching infinity. Therefore, the notion of strong secrecy was introduced by Maurer [31] which demands that I(M ; Z n tap ) shall approach 0 as n tends to infinity, where M is still assumed to be distributed uniformly.
Strong secrecy has been shown to imply that full decoding is only possible with an error probability that approaches the probability of guessing correctly without any channel output at all and it has also been shown to provide some resilience against identification attacks [9] , however, some messages might remain identifiable and no method was proposed of ensuring that any particular given message m not be identifiable.
This leads us to the concept of semantic security, which originates from the field of cryptography [22] , but has also been redefined to yield an information-theoretic secrecy criterion [7] [6] .
Following the discussion in [6] and adapting to our notation, we say that a sequence of codebooks achieves semantic security if
tends to 0 with n → ∞, where Π ranges over all partitions of M and P M over all possible probability distributions of M ∈ M. The positive term can be seen as the probability that the wiretapper solves its decoding task successfully given its channel output and an optimal decoder, while the second term can be seen as subtracting the probability that the decoding task is solved without knowledge of the wiretapper's channel output (i.e. by optimal guessing). This notion has a wide range of operational implications in the sense that it is impossible for the wiretapper to carry out an attack corresponding to any of Ahlswede's general communication tasks, as we show in Examples 1 and 2.
Remark 4. (37) remains unchanged even if we allow stochastic wiretapper's decoders, i.e. if we let f range over functions that map from Z n tap to probability mass functions on Π. On the other hand, it is not easy to prove directly that a particular wiretap code achieves semantic security. We therefore define a notion of secrecy that is more amenable to analysis, namely, we say that a sequence of wiretap codebooks achieves distinguishing security if max m1,m2,m1,m2 p Z n tap |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) − p Z n tap |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) TV (38) approaches 0 with n tending to infinity.
Remark 5. Due to the triangle inequality, this notion of distinguishing security is equivalent to max m1,m2 p Z n tap |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) − p TV approaching 0, where p is an arbitrary probability mass function on Z n tap that does not change with m 1 or m 2 .
In [6] , these and several other related concepts of information-theoretical secrecy and their interrelations are discussed. It turns out that distinguishing and semantic security are equivalent and strictly stronger than strong secrecy. On the other hand, if the definition of strong secrecy is strengthened to demand that max pM I(M ; Z n tap ) approaches 0, where p M ranges over all distributions of M (not just uniform), then it becomes equivalent to the notions of distinguishing and semantic security. We will present here versions of the proofs adapted to our notation only for the implications that seem most important to us in this context, namely that distinguishing security, which we show in Theorem 9 can be achieved over the multiple-access channel, implies both strong secrecy (Lemma 7) and semantic security (Lemma 8).
We now give two examples to show how the concept of semantic security implies resilience to the Ahlswede attacks discussed before. Example 1 is a special case of Example 2, but we lay it out explicitly anyway because we believe that it illustrates the ideas involved in a particularly accessible way and that the type of attack it describes could be particularly relevant in practice.
Example 1 (Identification attacks). Suppose the wiretapper's objective is to determine from an observation of Z n
tap whether the transmitted message was m or not, i.e. the attack we consider can be described by the partition Π = {{m}, M\{m}}. To this end, we assume that it has found some decoding function f : Z n tap → Π. Without assuming any probability distribution on M, we can define two types of error
where Em 2 is defined for eachm = m. Note that if the wiretapper is allowed to guess stochastically, it can trivially achieve any values for E 1 and Em 2 that satisfy E 1 + Em 2 = 1 (where Em 2 can be chosen the same for allm), even without observing Z n tap . On the other hand, we now show that if (37) is bounded above by δ > 0 and we fix an arbitrarym = m, the wiretapper cannot achieve much lower error probabilities E 1 and Em 2 , even given the observation of Z n tap . We first note that if P M is defined by the probability mass function p M (m) := 1 2 ,m = m ∨m =m 0, otherwise, then P M (M ∈ g) = 1/2 regardless of the choice of g. We can thus bound
where (39) is by assumption valid for all P M , (40) follows by plugging in P M as defined above and (41) follows by plugging in the definitions of E 1 and Em 2 . We can express this equivalently as
which shows that as (37) tends to 0, the wiretapper's minimum error probabilities approach values that can be achieved by stochastic guessing without observing any channel output at all.
Example 2 (General Ahlswede Attacks). As a second, slightly more involved example, we show the operational meaning of semantic security for attacks defined by more general partitions. Let Π = {M 1 , . . . , M ℓ } be a partition of M. Instead of assuming that the wiretapper can determine the correct partition element based on any transmitted message, we make a weaker assumption, namely that there is (at least) one message in each partition element that can be correctly identified. Formally, we say that the attacker has a decoding function f : Z n tap → Π and we fix messages m 1 ∈ M 1 , . . . , m ℓ ∈ M ℓ . For all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the error probabilities associated with partition element M k and message m k ∈ M k is then defined as
We observe that if stochastic guessing is allowed, the wiretapper can achieve any combination of error probabilities that satisfies E m1 Assuming that (37) is upper bounded by δ > 0, we have
where (42) is by assumption valid for all P M , (43) follows by plugging in P M and (44) follows by plugging in the definitions of the E m k k . We can express this equivalently as
which shows that also in this more general case, as (37) tends to 0, the wiretapper's error probabilities approach the values that can be achieved by stochastic guessing without observing any channel output at all, even if these error probabilities are only assumed to hold for one message in every partition element.
Lemma 7. If distinguishing security holds, i.e. (38) approaches 0, then so does max pM I(M ; Z n tap ). In particular, strong secrecy holds.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary distribution p M on M and observe that
wherem is chosen as the element in M that minimizes H(Z n tap |M =m) and the last inequality follows from Lemma 1, as long as δ < 1/4, where
Note that the latter variational distance term is clearly bounded by (38) , and so (46) approaches 0 if (38) does. Lemma 8. (37) is upper bounded by (38) . In particular, distinguishing security implies semantic security.
Proof. Fix a partition Π of M and a probability mass function p M on M that realize the outer maximum in (37) as well as a decoding function f : Z n tap → Π and a guess g ∈ Π that realize the inner maxima. We can then rewrite (37) as P 1 + P 2 − P 3 by steps as shown in (83) through (86) in the appendix, where P 1 , P 2 and P 3 are defined as in (87), (88) and (89) in the appendix.
Observe that P 2 = P M (M / ∈ g) and that, taking into account that g minimizes P M (M / ∈ g) over the elements of Π,
Observe further that, optimizing the outcome of the indicator function in P 1 for each term in the innermost sum individually, we get
· p Z n tap |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) − p Z n tap |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) TV , which is clearly upper bounded by (38) . Summarizing, we have seen that P 2 − P 3 ≤ 0 and P 1 is upper bounded by (38) and consequently (37) is upper bounded by (38) .
C. Coding for the Multiple-Access Channel
The capacity region of the multiple-access channel is well known and proofs can be found in almost any textbook on information theory, however, usually only the existence of a suitable codebook is proven. We need here the slightly stronger statement that the probability of randomly choosing a bad codebook is exponentially small, which requires only a slight modification of these proofs, which is, however, normally not given in the textbooks explicitly. For the sake of completeness, we state here the result that we need and present a proof that is similar to the one given in [24] .
. Then there exist decoding functions d n : Z n → {1, . . . , exp(nR 1 )} × {1, . . . , exp(nR 2 )} and γ 1 , γ 2 > 0 such that for large enough block length n, the codebook distributions of block length n and rates R 1 and R 2 satisfy
where we define the average decoding error probability as
Proof. We define typical sets T n 1,ε := {(x n , y n , z n ) : i(x n ; z n |y n ) ≥ n(I(X; Z|Y ) − ε)} T n 2,ε := {(x n , y n , z n ) : i(y n ; z n |x n ) ≥ n(I(Y ; Z|X) − ε)} T n 3,ε := {(x n , y n , z n ) : i(x n , y n ; z n ) ≥ n(I(X, Y ; Z) − ε)} T n ε := T n 1,ε ∩ T n 2,ε ∩ T n 3,ε and a corresponding joint typicality decoder
otherwise.
So in order to correctly decode a received message, we need the received sequence to be jointly typical with the encoded messages, while it must not be jointly typical with any other pair of codewords. We formalize these notions by defining the probabilities of three error events corresponding to the former being false as in (48) for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and the probabilities of error events corresponding to the latter being false as in (49), (50) and (51). We observe by the union bound and the We next bound each of these summands above by exp(−nβ) for sufficiently large n and sufficiently small but positive β.
To this end, we observe
where (54) follows for all α < 1 by substituting the definition of T n 1,ε and reformulating, (55) follows by Markov's inequality, (56) follows by reformulating and substituting the definition of Rényi divergence, and (57) follows for sufficiently small but positive β by taking α < 1 close enough to 1 such that the exponent in (56) is negative. This is possible by observing that the Rényi divergence approaches the Kullback-Leibler divergence for α → 1 and is finite and thus continuous since our alphabets are finite [36] .
typ,k := P Z n (X n , Y n , Z n ) / ∈ T n k,ε
E m1,m2 atyp,2 := P Z n ∃m 2 = m 2 : (X n , C 1 (m 2 ), Z n ) ∈ T n 2,ε
Moreover, we have
= exp(nR 1 )
x n ∈X n y n ∈Y n z n ∈Z n q X n (x n )q Y n ,Z n (y n , z n ) · 1 (x n ,y n ,z n )∈T n 1,ε (60) = exp(nR 1 )
x n ∈X n y n ∈Y n z n ∈Z n q X n ,Y n ,Z n (x n , y n , z n ) · exp(−i(x n ; y n |z n ))1 (x n ,y n ,z n )∈T n 1,ε (61) ≤ exp(n(R 1 − I(X; Z|Y ) + ε)), (62) ≤ exp(−nβ),
where (59) is an application of the union bound, (61) follows by reformulating and substituting the definition of information density, (62) follows by the definition of T n 1,ε and (63) follows for all sufficiently small β > 0 as long as ε is so small that R 1 − I(X; Z|Y ) + ε < 0.
We skip the calculations showing that E C1,C2 E 1,1 typ,k , E C1,C2 E 1,1 atyp,k ≤ exp(−nβ) for k ∈ {2, 3}, sufficiently large n and sufficiently small β > 0, since these statements follow in a straightforward manner by calculations very similar to the ones shown above.
Putting everything together and applying Markov's inequality, we get that for sufficiently large n, sufficiently small β > 0, γ 1 < β, and γ 2 < β − γ 1 , P C1,C2 (E > exp(−γ 1 n)) ≤ E C1,C2 (E) exp(−γ 1 n) ≤ 6 exp(−n(β − γ 1 )) ≤ exp(−γ 2 n), concluding the proof of the theorem.
D. Achievable Secrecy Rates under Distinguishing Security
Theorem 9. Suppose W = (W legit , W tap ) is a wiretap channel, q X and q Y are input distributions, R 1 < I(X; Z legit |Y )− I(X; Z tap |Y ) and R 2 < I(Y ; Z legit )−I(Y ; Z tap ). Then there exist randomness rates L 1 , L 2 , decoding functions d n : Z n legit →{1, . . . , exp(nR 1 )} × {1, . . . , exp(nL 1 )}× {1, . . . , exp(nR 2 )} × {1, . . . , exp(nL 2 )} and γ 1 , γ 2 > 0, such that for sufficiently large n, the probability P bad under the wiretap codebook distribution of drawing a bad pair of codebooks is less than exp(−nγ 2 ). A pair of codebooks is considered to be bad if it does not satisfy all of the following: 1) (Distinguishing Security). For any m 1 , m 2 , we have p Z n tap |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) − q Z n TV ≤ exp(−γ 1 n), i.e. the wiretap codebooks achieve distinguishing security and the variational distance vanishes exponentially. X n = C 1 (m 1 , ℓ 1 ), Y n = C 2 (m 2 , ℓ 2 ) .
is the average decoding error; i.e. the legitimate receiver is able to (on average) reconstruct both the messages and the randomness used at the transmitters with exponentially vanishing error probability.
Proof. Choose L 1 , L 2 such that I(X; Z tap |Y ) < L 1 < I(X; Z legit |Y ) − R 1 I(Y ; Z tap ) < L 2 < I(Y ; Z legit ) − R 2 .
We can look at the thus defined pair of random wiretap codebooks in two ways. On the one hand, they can be understood as a pair of codebooks of rates R 1 + L 1 and R 2 + L 2 . They fulfill all the requirements of Theorem 8, and so we get γ ′ 1 , γ ′ 2 > 0 such that P C1,C2 (E > exp(nγ ′ 1 )) ≤ exp(nγ ′ 2 ). On the other hand, we can look at them as a collection (C 1 (m 1 , ·)) exp(nR1) m1=1 of codebooks of rate L 1 and (C 2 (m 2 , ·)) exp(nR2) m2=1 of codebooks of rate L 2 , respectively. Therefore, each pair (m 1 , m 2 ) corresponds to a pair of codebooks fulfilling the requirements of Theorem 4, and so we get γ ′′ 1 , γ ′′ 2 > 0 such that for all m 1 , m 2 P C1,C2 p Z n |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) − q Z n TV > exp(−γ ′′ 1 n) ≤ exp (− exp (γ ′′ 2 n)) .
Choosing γ 1 := min(γ ′ 1 , γ ′′ 1 ), we can apply the union bound to get P bad ≤ P C1,C2 (E > exp(nγ ′ 1 ))+ exp(nR1) m1=1 exp(nR2) m2=1 P C1,C2 p Z n |C1(m1,·),C2(m2,·) − q Z n TV > exp(−γ ′′ 1 n) ≤ exp(γ ′ 2 n) + exp(n(R 1 + R 2 ) − exp(γ ′′ 2 n)) ≤ exp(γ 2 n) for sufficiently large n, as long as we choose γ 2 < γ ′ 2 .
APPENDIX P X n ,Y n ,Z n ((X n , Y n , Z n ) / ∈ T n 1,ε ) = P X n ,Y n ,Z n q Z n |X n ,Y n (Z n |X n , Y n ) q Z n |Y n (Z n |Y n ) > exp(n(I(X; Z|Y ) + ε)) (64)
= P X n ,Y n ,Z n q Z n |X n ,Y n (Z n |X n , Y n ) q Z n |Y n (Z n |Y n ) α−1 > exp(n(α − 1)(I(X; Z|Y ) + ε)) (65)
≤ E X n ,Y n ,Z n q Z n |X n ,Y n (Z n |X n , Y n ) q Z n |Y n (Z n |Y n ) α−1 · exp(−n(α − 1)(I(X; Z|Y ) + ε)) (66) = exp(n(α − 1) · (D α P X,Y,Z ||P X|Y P Z|Y P Y − I(X; Z|Y ) − ε)) ≤ exp(−nβ) (67)
exp(−nR 2 ) q Z n |Y n (z n |C 2 (m 2 )) q Z n (z n ) 1 (C2(m2),z n )∈T n 2,ε P typ,1 (C 2 (m 2 ), z n ) > 1 + 3 exp(−nβ) | C 1 ∈ C z n ,
exp(−nR 2 ) q Z n |Y n (z n |C 2 (m 2 )) q Z n (z n ) 1 (C2(m2),z n )∈T n 2,ε > 1 + 3 exp(−nβ) 1 + exp(−nβ)
exp(−nR 2 ) q Z n |Y n (z n |C 2 (m 2 )) q Z n (z n ) 1 (C2(m2),z n )∈T n 2,ε > 1 + exp(−nβ)   (70) ≤ exp − 1 3 exp(−n(I(Y ; Z) + ε + 2β − R 2 )) (71)
